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A B S T R AC T  | Colombia’s 2016 Peace Agreement with the FARC guerrilla extends beyond the end of the war 
and those measures for the disarmament, demobilization and reincorporation of former guerrillas. A large 
portion of the agreement is dedicated to the extension of the presence of the Colombian State into those areas 
of the country formerly under FARC control. The premise behind this extension, shared by Colombian elites 
as much as former guerrilla leaders, is that if the State remains absent then the areas will be occupied by 
criminal organizations interested in controlling the FARC cocaine trade, and, more generally, that the vast and 
sparsely populated territories will further descend into barbarism. This premise resonates with a long arc of 
persistent aspiration for a national identity that is shaped by the opposition between civilization and barbarism. 
Especially since the transformations efected by Colombia’s 1991 Constitution, the extension of civilization has 
been increasingly identiied with the expansion of the rule of law and, therefore, with law’s mythical powers 
to order society and control barbarism. Under this premise, violence is equated to lawlessness and the remedy 
for violence assimilated to the expansion of the Estado social de derecho, the state form that embodies the rule 
of law in the Colombian Constitution. The foundational narrative of civilization versus barbarism, relected by 
the hopes placed on the rule of law and the recipes for State-building by the 2016 Peace Agreement, continues 
to obscure the continuities between law and violence, and particularly the fact that the execution of legal 
institutions in formerly “lawless” territories maintains the violence of the moment of the adoption of legality. 
Both theoretical and empirical explorations of the present process of expansion of the Colombian State require 
critical examination of the hopes vested on law. A critical examination of this sort needs to engage with 
the continuities between law and violence explored in contemporary political philosophy and developed by 
Jean and John Comarof’s ethnography. The productivity of this approach is highlighted by the essays in this 
dossier, which share the impulse to interrupt the foundational narrative of civilization and barbarism that 
remains in the institutions of Colombias’s present post-conlict endeavor.
K E Y WO R D S  | Thesaurus: civilization; peace. Author: barbarism; Jean and John Comarof; law and violence; 
post-conlict; state-making; territorial peace
Derecho y violencia en el posconflicto colombiano: formación y transformación del Estado tras el Acuerdo 
de Paz
R E S U M E N  | El Acuerdo de Paz suscrito con las FARC en 2016 se extiende más allá del in de la guerra y de las 
medidas para el desarme, desmovilización y reincorporación de los exguerrilleros. Una parte importante de 
este acuerdo está dedicada a la ampliación de la presencia del Estado colombiano en aquellas áreas del país que 
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antes se encontraban bajo el control de las FARC. La premisa tras esta expansión, compartida tanto por la élite 
colombiana como por los exlíderes guerrilleros, es que si el Estado permanece ausente entonces estas áreas 
serán ocupadas por organizaciones criminales interesadas en controlar el comercio de cocaína de las FARC y, 
en términos más generales, que los amplios y poco poblados territorios descenderán, aún más, a la barbarie. 
Esta premisa es reminiscente de la vieja aspiración a una identidad nacional modelada por la oposición entre 
civilización y barbarie. Especialmente desde la expedición de la Constitución de 1991, la imposición de la civili-
zación se ha identiicado cada vez más con la expansión del Estado de derecho y, por lo tanto, con los poderes 
míticos de la ley para organizar a la sociedad y controlar la barbarie. Aquí, la violencia se equipara a la 
ausencia de la ley, y se considera que el remedio para la violencia es la expansión del “Estado social de 
derecho”; esa forma de Estado que recoge el principio del Estado de derecho en la Constitución colombiana. La 
narrativa fundacional de la civilización y la barbarie, relejada en la esperanza puesta en el Estado de derecho 
y el conjunto de recetas para la construcción estatal por el Acuerdo de Paz de 2016, continúa oscureciendo las 
continuidades entre la ley y la violencia, y particularmente el hecho de que la ejecución del derecho en terri-
torios que antes “carecían de ley”, reproduce la violencia del momento de adopción de la legalidad. Las explora-
ciones tanto teóricas como empíricas del actual proceso de expansión del Estado colombiano demandan un 
análisis crítico de las esperanzas depositadas en la ley. Un análisis crítico de este tipo debe tener en cuenta las 
continuidades entre la ley y la violencia exploradas en la ilosofía política contemporánea y desarrollada por 
la etnografía de Jean y John Comarof. La utilidad de este enfoque se resalta en los ensayos de este dossier, que 
comparten el impulso de interrumpir la narrativa fundacional de civilización y barbarie que aparece en las 
instituciones del posconlicto colombiano.
PA L A B R A S  CLAVE | Thesaurus: civilización; paz. Autor: barbarie; derecho y violencia; formación del Estado; Jean 
y John Comarof; paz territorial; posconlicto
Direito e violência no pós-conflito colombiano: formação e transformação do Estado após o Acordo de Paz
R E S U M O  | O Acordo de Paz irmado com as Forças Armadas Revolucionárias da Colômbia (FARC) em 2016 
estende-se além do im da guerra e das medidas de desarmamento, desmobilização e reincorporação dos 
ex-guerrilheiros. Uma grande parte do acordo está dedicada à extensão da presença do Estado colombiano 
nas áreas do país que antes estavam sob o controle das FARC. A premissa por trás dessa expansão, comparti-
lhada tanto pela elite colombiana quanto pelos ex-líderes guerrilheiros, é que, se o estado continuar ausente, 
essas áreas serão ocupadas por organizações criminosas interessadas em controlar o tráico de cocaína das 
FARC e, em termos mais gerais, os grandes territórios escassamente povoados cairão ainda mais na barbárie. 
Essa premissa se relete na aspiração persistente de ter uma identidade nacional moldada pela oposição entre 
civilização e barbárie. Principalmente a partir das transformações realizadas pela Constituição colombiana 
de 1991, a extensão da civilização tem sido cada vez mais identiicada com a expansão do estado de direito e, 
portanto, com os poderes míticos da lei para organizar a sociedade e controlar a barbárie. Sob essa premissa, a 
violência é equiparada com a expansão do “Estado social de direito”; o tipo de Estado que encapsula o império 
do direito na Constituição colombiana. A narrativa fundadora da civilização versus barbárie, reletida pela 
esperança colocada no estado de direito e nas fórmulas para a construção do Estado do Acordo de Paz de 2016, 
continua a obscurecer as continuidades entre lei e violência, e particularmente o fato de que a execução de 
instituições legais em territórios que antes “careciam de leis”, mantém a violência do momento da adoção da 
legalidade. Ambas as explorações teóricas e as empíricas deste processo de expansão do Estado colombiano 
exigem uma análise crítica das esperanças depositadas na lei. Uma análise crítica desse tipo deve levar em 
conta as continuidades entre lei e violência exploradas na ilosoia política contemporânea e desenvolvidas pela 
etnograia de Jean e John Comarof. A produtividade dessa abordagem é destacada nos ensaios deste dossiê, que 
compartilham o impulso de interromper a narrativa fundacional da civilização e da barbárie que permanece nas 
instituições do atual esforço pós-conlito da Colômbia..
PA L AV R A S - C H AV E  | Thesaurus: civilização; paz. Autor: barbárie; direito e violência; formação do Estado; Jean e 
John Comarof; paz territorial; pós-conlito
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Introduction
Colombia’s 2016 Peace Agreement with the FARC 
guerrilla extends beyond the end of the war, and 
beyond measures for the disarmament, demobilization 
and reincorporation of former guerrillas (Gobierno 
Nacional de Colombia and FARC-EP 2016). A large por-
tion of the Peace Agreement is dedicated to the exten-
sion of the presence of the Colombian State into those 
areas of the country formerly under FARC control. 
The irst point in particular, devoted to rural reform, 
focuses on bringing State institutions to underdevel-
oped territories, promoting equality and full citizen-
ship rights for their inhabitants. The second point, on 
political participation, among other goals enhances the 
representation of these territories in Congress and cit-
izen participation in planning their development. The 
third topic, on the deinitive cease-ire, also strength-
ens State-institutions, particularly new institutions 
dedicated to ighting the paramilitary armies and crim-
inal organizations that might ill the power void left by 
the FARC. Point four focuses on creating and directing 
State institutions to ight drug traicking, and point 
ive creates a new transitional justice system, including 
a tribunal, a truth commission and a new State entity 
dedicated to inding people who went missing during 
the war. Point six focuses on the implementation and 
veriication of the Peace Agreement. Woven across 
these six points that are the core of the Peace Agreement 
is what former Peace Commissioner Sergio Jaramillo 
described as “territorial peace”: the expansion of the 
State and the rule of law to the territories formerly 
dominated by the guerrilla, a robust expansion that 
goes beyond Army and Police presence, and includes 
manifold development programs and participatory 
government designed to expand the presence of the 
Colombian State.
The premise behind this extension of State presence, 
shared by Colombian elites as much as by former guer-
rilla leaders, is that if the State remains absent, then the 
areas will be occupied by criminal organizations inter-
ested in controlling the FARC cocaine trade, and, more 
generally, the vast and sparsely populated territories 
will further descend into barbarism. This premise reso-
nates with a long arc of persistent aspiration for a nation-
al identity that is shaped by the opposition between 
civilization and barbarism, an opposition that remains 
present in the aspirations of the 2016 Peace Agreement 
when it assumes it is State presence that will, efectively, 
guarantee peace.
The expansion of civilization —especially since the trans-
formations efected by Colombia’s 1991 Constitution— has 
been increasingly identiied with the expansion not 
only of State presence, but also of law’s mythical pow-
ers to order society and control barbarism (Asamblea 
Nacional Constituyente 1991). Violence is equated to 
law-less-ness, and the remedy for violence equated 
with the expansion of the “Estado Social de Derecho;” 
the State that embodies the rule of law in the Colombi-
an Constitution. The foundational Republican narrative 
of civilization and barbarism, which Colombia shares 
with most countries in Latin America, is premised on 
the radical and antipodal separation between law and 
violence: the latter is the preeminent civilizing device 
that operates as the remedy for the former. Since inde-
pendence, this narrative may be detected at every may-
or juncture in Colombia history.
The 2016 Peace Agreement is not an exception. As we will 
argue in this essay, this foundational narrative —with its 
hopes placed on the rule of law and on diverse recipes 
for State-building— obscures the continuities between 
law and violence. Ignoring this continuity, in our view, 
hides the fact that the execution of legal institutions in 
formerly “lawless” territories continues to enact the 
violent moment of the adoption of legality. Instead, 
we argue, both theoretical and empirical explorations 
of the present process of the expansion of the Colombi-
an State require critical examination of the hopes vest-
ed on law. This critical examination demands, in turn, 
a theoretical engagement with the many continuities 
between law and violence explored in contemporary 
political philosophy. The productivity of this approach 
is highlighted in the essays in this dossier, which share 
the impulse to interrupt the foundational narrative of 
civilization and barbarism that remains in the institu-
tions of the present post-conlict endeavor.
On October 25 and 27, 2017, a group of scholars met in 
Bogotá with Jean and John Comarof to relect on sever-
al aspects of the idea of “territorial peace” that operates 
as a thrusting principle of the 2016 Peace Agreement 
between the Colombian government and the FARC. 
Taking as a starting point many of Comarofs’ theoret-
ical and ethnographic insights that complicate the sep-
aration of law and violence in the postcolonial world 
of our times, the papers discussed at the workshop 
took on diverse analytical avenues that interrupted the 
foundational narrative of civilization and barbarism. In 
this essay, we frame the workshop and the papers in the 
dossier around our argument that the foundational nar-
rative of civilization and barbarism obscures the many 
ways in which legal reform and State-making recipes do 
not bring about civilization, but, quite on the contrary, 
reinstate and fuel the very violence and barbarism they 
sought to eradicate.
In the irst two sections of the essay, we tell the story 
of how the foundational narrative of civilization and 
barbarism has played out throughout Colombia’s histo-
ry, particularly drawing attention to how law and society 
studies would greatly beneit and gain analytic advan-
tage from interrupting the separation of law and vio-
lence that premises the foundational narrative. In the 
third section, we show how Jean and John Comarof’s 
work is an exemplary theoretical and ethnographic 
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work that embraces the continuity of law and violence. 
Here, we argue how, by making the idea of spectrali-
ty a centerpiece of their work, their insights it within 
a wider tradition of political philosophy that —since 
Walter Benjamin’s 1921 Critique of Violence— has recov-
ered the continuity of lawmaking and law-preserving 
violence as a useful device for the analysis of diverse 
social phenomena. In the inal section of the essay, 
we return to the foundational narrative of civilization 
and barbarism to show how the oicial idea of “territo-
rial peace” at the center of the 2016 Peace Agreement 
is the modernized version of that narrative. In this 
context, we present the papers in the dossier as a wel-
comed example of the sort of theoretical and empirical 
work that —productively drawing on the continuity 
between law and violence— shows how civilizational 
post-conlict public policies have reproduced many of 
the material and symbolic forms of violence that the 
Peace Agreement sought to overcome.
Civilization or barbarism: The foundational 
narrative1
Since independence in the early nineteenth century, 
Latin American elites have been engaged in a quest for 
national identity, and anxiety about the nation has been 
a persistent preoccupation. The civilizing power of law 
has been central to that endeavor, exempliied in nation-
al constitutions as well as through the regulation of 
everyday life by civil, commercial, family, and labor laws. 
Underlying the search for national identity through law 
is political liberalism’s foundational metaphor: will Latin 
American nations be civilized, or will they fall under the 
sway of barbarism?
Colombian nineteenth century liberal elites shared this 
aspiration, and hoped that law would be instrumental 
in the construction of national civilizations, both as a 
bulwark against Spanish authoritarianism and religious 
fanaticism, and as protection against dictatorships by 
military leaders and other caudillos. Belief in republican 
law as a means to usher in civilization and progress 
was widespread among liberals, as was the call for the 
education of the people in the forms and substance of 
liberal law and democratic values. This education how-
ever was frequently built on intense elite mistrust and 
contempt for the people who needed “education.”
Conservatism, a ierce reaction against early nine-
teenth century liberalism, shared with its antagonist 
the desire to construct national civilizations, and the 
centrality of law to this endeavor. Conservatives resist-
ed turning to France, England and the United States for 
1 Most of the ideas in this section have been previously explored 
by one of us. See Lemaitre 2011; 2015 and especially Lemaitre 
(forthcoming 2019) for a more detailed account of the implica-
tions for legal culture of the foundational narrative.
inspiration and instead coined a Hispanic nationalism 
that was also romantic and rebellious, and where law 
was natural as read by neo-scholastic theology and legal 
doctrine. Natural law was as the embodiment of civili-
zation, and conservatives promoted the recovery of its 
Catholic lineage, against the liberal notion of natural 
rights. Natural law, rather than republican institutions, 
was the legal cornerstone of this conservative civili-
zation, expressed in constitutions that re-established 
Catholicism as a State religion, and gave the Church 
extensive powers for the administration of indigenous 
territories through “misiones” or covenants.2
By the late nineteenth century, liberalism, triumphant 
over conservatism in most of the region, was trans-
formed by the inluence of positivist philosophy and 
its call to both order and progress, not just liberty (as 
relected in the Brazilian lag and its motto: Ordem 
e Progresso). Positivism built on the representation 
of elites as leading the nation from barbarism to civ-
ilization, except European civilization was now repre-
sented as the endpoint of a scientiic social evolution. 
In Colombia, the conservative triumph against liberals 
during the civil wars resulted in the establishment 
of a deeply inluential political project, Regeneration 
(“Regeneración”), which would rule the country under 
the sign of its 1886 Constitution. Regeneration, weld-
ed conservative veneration for Catholic institutions, 
Hispanic nationalism, and the same positivist mod-
ernizing drive shared by liberals in the region, a drive 
that embraced science, transformed the economy and 
ushered the country into the twentieth century (Consejo 
Nacional de Delegatarios 1886).
Law was at the center of this transformation, beyond 
the 1886 Constitution. Codiication of legislation, espe-
cially the adoption and adaptation of Napoleon’s Civil 
Code, was part and parcel of Colombia’s conservative 
positivism. Codiication was “scientiic” because it was 
systematic; its “science” was also deeply racist. Intel-
lectuals for the most part believed that nation building 
required the “improvement” of the mixed raced popula-
tion through the introduction of “white blood” by mis-
cegenation and, in some countries, through fostering 
white European immigration. Liberty was increasingly 
subordinated to order, and new limitations on sufrage 
relected both the fear of popular uprisings and racist 
positivist science that attested to the superiority of 
2 Notably, Law 89 of 1890 in Colombia exempted indigenous 
peoples from criminal responsibility and from the dissolu-
tion of collective property precisely because they were “not 
civilized” and therefore not subject to general laws (Congreso 
de la República de Colombia 1890). Similar provisions exempt-
ing indigenous people from criminal responsibility due to 
their “diminished responsibility” or cultural condition were 
common to criminal procedures codes throughout Latin 
America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
They coexisted with indigenous servitude and slavery-like 
exploitation justiied by their lack of civilization.
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European whites. The task was still irst to civilize peo-
ples that were indigenous and brown, peasant and her-
etic, physically located in the hinterlands and lawless. 
Civilization, in these terms, was well worth violence 
and authoritarian rule, or, in the Colombian version, 
the severely restricted democracy enacted under the 
1886 Constitution.
The triumph of conservative positivism did much to 
isolate Colombia from most of Latin America, where 
liberalism triumphed, and the irst half of the twen-
tieth century was dominated by social uprisings and 
challenges to the political projects of the previous 
century. A persistent longing for progress and devel-
opment among elites became embedded in a growing 
sense of failure. Governing elites faced new political 
challenges, especially from the emerging Latin Ameri-
can left, whose cosmopolitan allegiances to internation-
al socialism imbricated with local rebellions, especially 
those of indigenous peoples demanding collective land 
ownership, and with the remnants of a defeated egali-
tarian liberalism that remained in abeyance.3 Echoes of 
this emergence in Colombia were adopted by a liberal 
party that moved to the left, a move that also fueled the 
mid-century civil war, and that would plant the seeds 
for the communist guerrillas founded in the 1960s.
Emerging socialist frames did not abandon the foun-
dational metaphor of civilization versus barbarism; 
instead, they inverted the terms. Indigenous and peasant 
peoples were reimagined as virtuous and law-abiding, 
and capitalists and landowners as depraved and lawless. 
When the law did not defend the rights of the down-
trodden, especially indigenous peasants and workers, 
it was denounced as barbaric: the aspiration was to 
enshrine laws and constitutions that would relect the 
moral superiority of the poor, thus bringing progress 
and civilization. Liberalism was also condemned for 
its failure to ensure the implementation of laws that 
(on the books) protected the poor, but that in practice 
did little to limit abuses and humiliation, keeping the 
nation in a state of barbarism.
Demands for justice as the efective implementation of 
laws fueled not only the Revolution in Mexico, but also 
the emergence of a new type of liberal governments, 
now inluenced by socialist and communist ideas, with 
liberals working sometimes in alliance with communists 
and socialists. When liberals came into power again in 
the 1930s, they soon adopted a “social” deinition of 
civilization, materialized in social welfare and labor 
protection legislation, and aspiring to fulill the old 
promises of liberty and equality. Again, these new laws 
often remained “on the books” generating a new wave 
3 For this egalitarian liberalism, also known as radical liber-
alism, see Gargarella (2005; 2014). He distinguishes it from 
liberalism proper, which he sees as an eventual ally of con-
servative forces through power-sharing agreements.
of protest and frustration which threatened the sta-
bility of elite rule, setting the stage for a backlash of 
anti-communist rhetoric during the Cold War.
Colombia arrived on the scene of the Cold War rather 
late, as it fought its last civil war between liberals and 
conservatives from 1948 to 1958, just in time for the 
Cuban revolution in 1959. The war, known as “La Violen-
cia,” ended with a successful liberal-conservative power 
sharing agreement, one that allowed the emergence of 
an establishment irmly committed to the alliance with 
the United States. Power alternation re-shaped the 1886 
Constitution, which had survived the social reform of 
the 1930s, and its restricted democracy was carefully 
administered by both parties, making Colombia the 
only country to almost completely escape the military 
dictatorships in the years that followed.
The Cold War meant for Colombia as for Latin Amer-
ica, a renewed commitment to authoritarian rule. Yet, 
underlying the justiication of the use of violence by 
both Cold War liberals and by communists, remained 
the rhetorical use of the appeal to civilization and law. 
Cold War liberalism was clearly aligned with the need 
to suspend laws protecting civil liberties in order to 
defend the nation from communism. However, civil 
liberties were suspended but not rejected; the rhetoric 
was instead of exceptionalism, a suspension but not 
a subversion of liberal values. These values were also 
expressed in the law-and-development nation-building 
projects that lourished hand-in-hand with dictator-
ships and restricted democracies.
But the 1960s saw the failure of liberal reforms and the 
frustration of attempts to achieve social justice within 
the framework of existing legal systems, symbolized 
by the U.S. package known as the Alliance for Progress. 
The groundwork for increased political violence was set. 
Communist armed struggle, supported by the Soviet 
Union and China, seemed to be the only solution for 
socialists and communists that had previously actively 
participated in national politics. The appeal to law also 
persisted in the armed struggle embraced by commu-
nists, who frequently evoked the socialist inversion 
of terms of the earlier decades, arguing for the need 
for the people to take up arms to defend law against 
elite lawlessness. The Cuban revolution of 1959 
became a symbol of the need for violence to trans-
form unjust regimes, and Marxism built on a Catholic 
culture arguing that rebellion was justiied by natural 
law, and often by the fact that laws that granted rights 
were never put into efect.
The end of the decade brought a dramatic increase 
in the number of communist guerrillas in the 
region, the collapse of the Alliance for Progress and its 
reformist aspirations, and a wave of military coups, as 
well as nominal democracies with radically restricted 
civil rights under harsher state-of-siege legislation. 
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It ushered in Colombia as elsewhere in the region a 
time of unabashed lawlessness, enacted as a defense of 
order, sometimes within the forms of the law. Support 
for military and state-of-siege domestic rule came 
both from national anti-communist movements, and 
from the United States in its role as regional hegemon. 
The defense of civilization became part of the rhetoric 
of the dictators, just as it had been of the Cold War lib-
erals; legality and legal reform, however, was seldom 
part of this defense, suspended until it could be enjoyed 
once the nation was safe from communist threat.
In Colombia, the Cold War dissolved the old links between 
liberals and Colombian communists, and set the stage 
for the emergence of communist guerrillas following 
international schisms: the 1960s saw the foundation 
of pro-soviet and pro-China communist guerrillas, 
and other guerrillas inspired by the Cuban revolution. 
They lourished in the vast and fertile areas of the 
country that were sparsely populated, where landless 
peasants sought to stake a claim, and where indige-
nous peoples still refused to settle in towns under the 
supervision of the Catholic Church.
By the 1980s, repression had engendered a wide-rang-
ing resistance, extended beyond the proportionately 
small guerrillas. New alliances brought forth the 
regional human rights movement, which peaceful-
ly resisted the massive violation of civil and political 
rights. The human rights movement once more trust-
ed the civilizing power of law against the monstros-
ity of dictatorships and restricted democracies, with 
their mass detention centers and routine practice 
of forced disappearances, torture and executions of 
suspected communist sympathizers and subversives. 
Lawyers and activists defended political prisoners 
and denounced abuses, and eventually brought perpe-
trators to trial. The human rights movement and its 
political commitments have dominated Latin Ameri-
can politics —and a considerable proportion of law and 
society studies— since the end of the Cold War in 1989, 
heralding the return of a triumphant liberalism repre-
sented by the “new constitutionalism.”
The new constitutionalism and the new 
barbarians
Latin America renewed its commitment to law after the 
Cold War ended, placing it at the center of social move-
ment activism and policy-making (Couso, Huneeus and 
Sieder 2010). A wave of new constitutions swept the 
region, fanning hopes for redistribution and welfare 
reform (Barrett, Chávez and Rodriguez-Garavito 2008; 
De Sousa Santos 2010) as well as hopes for democra-
cy and the rule of law through more liberal reforms 
(García 2002). With the new constitutions came the 
development of new constitutionalism, comprised 
of normative legal theories that defend liberal egali-
tarianism (Alegre and Gargarella 2007; Arango 2012; 
García, Rodríguez and Uprimny 2006; Vásquez 2015) as 
the foundation of Latin American nations. Aspiration 
to social justice through redistributive constitution-
alism has not been without its critics, and neither has 
the elevation of the rule of law as an end in itself (Nader 
and Mattei 2008; Trubek and Santos 2006). However, 
despite such criticism, the increasingly hegemonic 
position on the continent is that the road to justice is 
paved with legal reform, and the civilizing power of law 
remains unquestioned.
The turn to left-liberal legal reform is deeply linked to the 
vibrant human rights movement against dictatorships. 
This movement was the prelude to the new consti-
tutions, and provided much of the energy fueling the 
normative aspirations of the period. It garnered sup-
port from diferent fronts, from former insurgents to 
traditional liberals to US foundations (Keck and Sikkink 
1998; Meili 2001). It also gave rise to a transnational 
movement clamoring for trials of former dictators 
and abusive military oicers, and to a speciic branch 
of human rights focusing on transitions to democra-
cy (Sikkink 2011). Other social movements, including 
indigenous and Afro Latin Americans, women and 
LGBTI, tapped into an international turn to human 
rights frames for social movements and lobbying for 
legal reform (Lemaitre 2009).
Colombia both followed regional trend and set their 
trajectory, in aspiration as well as in its internal con-
tradictions. The country adopted a new Constitution 
in 1991, touted as the inal peace treaty that would end 
war with the guerrillas and the sense of generalized 
violence and chaos emerging from the war between 
the State and the increasingly strong cocaine cartels 
(Lemaitre 2009; 2011). Several guerrillas, in the wake 
of the fall of the Soviet Union, gave up armed struggle 
and joined the new regime, overtly more democratic 
and with more robust human rights guarantees than 
the 1886 Constitutions. Pablo Escobar himself, who 
had led cartel-sponsored terrorism against State 
institutions, turned on the same day the Constituent 
Assembly voted favorably for an article prohibiting 
extradition of nationals to the United States. And in 
the years that followed, the newly created Constitu-
tional Court adopted a vigorous jurisprudence for the 
defense of the liberal values that had been mauled by 
Cold War authoritarianism, making Colombia a beacon 
for regional constitutional law.
Social science literature on human rights in Latin America 
(much of it written by foreign visitors), as well as human 
rights reports, chronicled the traumatic efects of wide-
spread human rights violations under military regimes 
or restricted democracies like those of Colombia and 
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Mexico.4 Their regard, and their emphasis on violations 
of human rights, however, has had little comprehension 
of the role of law in the creation of horror, beyond the 
description of lawlessness as its necessary pre-condition. 
Instead, like liberals and socialists before them, they 
share an appreciation of law as civilization, and a rejec-
tion of lawlessness as a separate space of barbarism. 
Old tropes die hard. With the return of democracies, the 
experience of horror has faded, but not the rejection of 
lawlessness represented by both popular culture and by 
crime. Also persistent is the romantic description of the 
poor whose protection seems to require revolutionary 
violence against elite lawlessness.
Academic literature persistently describes lawlessness as 
the warp and woof of everyday life in the region. The per-
sistent concern with lawlessness as the root of violence 
and inequality echoes the nineteenth century themes 
of civilization and barbarism. Cultural change and the 
creation of a “culture of citizenship” (cultura ciudadana) 
are frequently presented as the solution for popular 
culture’s penchant to lout the law. State-building also 
appears as a favored solution to the cultural problem pre-
sented by lawlessness. Both in the cultural explanation 
and in the State-building prescriptions for lawlessness, 
the rule of law (if not the State itself) appears to exist 
in a diferent world from that of violence. Civilization, 
civility, citizenship and law appear radically opposed to 
everyday lawlessness, which generates violence, chaos, 
and injustice. The underlying call seems to be: if only the 
law were obeyed, there would be justice.
The pull of the foundational metaphor, pitting law 
against barbarism, tends to ignore the many ways in 
which law and violence are mutually constitutive. The 
turn to human rights, as a reaction against dictator-
ships that gave life to sections of international law 
and constitutional law that were previously devoid 
of much practical meaning. This relationship has lim-
ited the potential of human rights as a vocabulary for 
emancipatory aspirations, limited as they tend to be, 
to the rejection of State violence. Law also shapes vio-
lence, most obviously by deinition: either directly (by 
deeming certain social practices and worlds illegal, thus 
shaping the exact contours of violence), or indirectly (by 
refusing to regulate social life where conlict is bound to 
happen, as in informal and illegal markets). Both moves 
are exempliied through two phenomena directly linked 
to social violence: prohibition, and the reduction of the 
size and presence of the State as provider of social and 
police services.
Prohibition, a complex national and international legal 
regime whereby the interdiction of certain drugs 
4 In the 1970s, Amnesty pioneered reports on disappearances and 
imprisonments under military regimes in Latin America, see 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr13/083/1977/
en/. See also Green (1994); Tate (2007); Taussig (1984).
is carried out through the use of military force, is 
directly responsible for the sharp rise both in cartel and 
police violence in large sections of Latin America. While 
the violence in Colombia in the 1980s and in Mexico in the 
2000s is the most visible, prohibition is also the direct 
cause of elevated murder rates in Central America and 
the Caribbean, and contributes signiicantly to violence 
in Venezuela, Brazil and Colombia. The militarization of 
interdiction generates a constant slippage of the State’s 
use of lethal force away from the democratic constitu-
tional frame, and into both martial law and the illegal use 
of State force. It also keeps the price of drugs artiicially 
high, and the absence of taxes or any form of regula-
tion produce enormous proits, which in turn, inance 
corruption of State oicials as well as full governance by 
criminal organizations in some territories. 5
The reduction of State functions after neoliberal 
reforms is also clearly linked to the rise of certain 
types of violence. As Comarof and Comarof (2006) 
explain for Africa, neoliberal policies advocating a 
reduction of the State have resulted in increased vio-
lence as armed groups strive to dominate deregulated 
economies and spaces. State reduction has multiple 
causes: it can be linked to neoliberal structural reform 
programs that promote self-help (as argued for example 
by Goldstein 2005), but it can also have other origins. For 
example, the dramatic increase in violence in Venezuela 
after Chavez’ socialist revolution is not linked to a neo-
liberal reform program, but rather to the erosion of cer-
tain State institutions under socialism, particularly the 
police and criminal investigation units (Briceño 2012).
Furthermore, the civilization championed by liberalism 
can also be violent, and lawless spaces a place of refuge. 
Historically there is ample evidence of indigenous peo-
ples, former slaves and landless peasants leeing the pur-
view of the State into the hinterlands in order to avoid 
injustice, especially forced labor and conscription, but 
also to avoid the regulation of everyday life that comes 
with living under the law (Clastres 1989; Scott 2009). 
Within these lawless spaces, however, norms emerge 
as do forms of regulation that are increasingly studied 
by social scientists, forms that signal the absorption or 
assumption of State functions by diferent organizations.
Some legal scholars who have articulated a 
counter-hegemonic view of law build their understanding 
on the idea that ordinary people self-regulate in the mar-
gins of State power, and that this is the only legitimate 
kind of law. Similarly, some legal scholars have also 
5 Prohibition gives a market advantage to the ruthless and to 
those who can ensure territorial control. For a thoughtful 
explanation of this link see: Andreas and Wallman (2009). See 
also Reuter (2009) linking violence to the youth of participants, 
the high value of the drug and the intensity of law enforce-
ment. See Snyder and Duran-Martinez (2009) for a surprising 
take on the role of the State in drug related violence.
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turned to legal pluralism as a framework that can rep-
resent law outside the boundaries of State law, building 
on the early work of Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1977). 
For Antonio Wolkmer (2003) and Oscar Correas (2003), 
legal pluralism is, at its heart, emancipatory because 
its origin lies outside the power of the State. However, 
as De Sousa Santos has also pointed out (2001), armed 
non-State actors can also regulate illegal and informal 
social relations. In Colombia for example, guerrillas 
beneiting from cocaine and illegal mining markets 
set up their own forms of insurgent governance that 
include taxation and the provision of social services, 
conlict resolution, and sometimes also infrastructure 
such as roads (Arjona 2015). In Mexico, cartels have also 
assumed similar State functions in the regions they 
dominate (Maldonado 2011).
Similar mechanisms are at work, although with a 
much smaller investment in policing the boundaries, 
in other illegal and informal markets. Less violent 
than illegal markets, informal markets also sufer 
because of lack of State regulation (or beneit from a 
lack of enforcement of rules, depending on the point 
of view).6 Communities often assume the functions 
that the State refuses to perform in markets that are 
not formally legal, for example, by solving conlicts 
through community justice mechanisms, as in De Sousa 
Santos’ example of a neighborhood association solving 
disputes between tenants and landowners in an informal 
settlement (De Sousa Santos 1977; see also Godoy 2006; 
Goldstein 2003).7
In sum, when scholars face the conceptual challenges 
presented by violence, they ind a productive avenue 
in overcoming the historical pull of the dichotomy 
between “civilization and barbarism.” They might for 
example explore instead the ways in which law is in 
fact a constitutive part of the social spaces described as 
lawless, and the ways in which social spaces deined 
as lawless are efectively regulated. They ind law in 
practice is not irmly located on the side of civilization 
as the absence of violence, nor is violence consistently 
an expression of barbarism located in marginal physical 
and social spaces. These insights, expressed in Walter 
Benjamin’s much-cited Critique of Violence (1996 [1921]), 
can undergird complex examinations of the ways in 
which law and violence constitute and deine each 
6 For the argument stating that the lack of enforcement is a 
deliberate political move, see Holland (2015).
7 There is abundant social science literature in English and 
in Spanish describing informal markets in housing (see for 
example Fischer, McCann and Auyero 2015), commerce and 
informal labor (Centeno and Portes 2006), mining and the 
exploitation of natural resources, and illegal economies gen-
erally. The governance of these illegal worlds remains little 
studied and little understood in law and society scholarship, 
even though there is ample evidence in political anthropol-
ogy of their intersections with state law and institutions 
(Arias 2006; Dewey and St. Germain 2012; Holston 2008).
other, the mutual dependency of State-controlled and 
so-called “lawless” lands, and the forms of governance 
that regulate everyday life outside the purview of the 
State. A theoretical consideration of the continuity of 
law and violence is thus in point. What does it mean to 
approach the dynamics of State-making through a con-
ceptual lens that sees the continuities between law and 
violence? What does it mean for law and society studies 
to oppose the idea that legal reform is, by essence, a 
civilizing instrument that can be explicitly directed by 
policymakers to end material or symbolic violence? In 
what sense is the foundational narrative of civilization 
and barbarism transformed by a perspective that looks 
at the continuity between law and violence? The next 
section examines such questions.
Civilization, barbarism, and the continuity  
of law and violence
Our answer to these queries takes as a starting point 
some of the insights of a tradition of political philoso-
phy that, since Walter Benjamin’s 1921 essay Critique of 
Violence, has critically approached the liberal concep-
tion of law as the preeminent antidote against violence. 
In our view, the “philosophico-historical” critique pro-
posed by Benjamin (Benjamin 1996 [1921] 238; see also 
241, 251), and developed by an almost century-long 
tradition of political philosophy that has followed his 
ideas, grounds the possibility to interrupt the Colom-
bian foundational myth of civilization and barbarism. 
Rather than summarizing this theoretical debate, we 
concentrate on examining what we deem to be an 
exemplary body of work that could be mobilized to per-
form that interruption. Jean and John Comarof’s work 
—and especially “Law and Disorder in the Postcolony” 
(2006) and The Truth about Crime (2016)—, productively 
draws on Benjaminian insights to explore the complex 
intertwining of law and violence in polities in the global 
south at this stage of “millennial capitalism” (Comarof 
and Comarof 2000). In addition, understanding how the 
Comarofs’ theoretical and ethnographic views are driv-
en by the Benjaminian canon also helps to frame and 
articulate many of the ideas elaborated by the authors 
of the essays included in the dossier.
Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Violence is constantly 
mentioned in Jean and John Comarof’s work. However, 
detecting the extent and direction of this inluence is 
a more complex endeavor. On the one hand, as María 
del Rosario Acosta contends in her essay in this dossier, 
“Benjamin remains a constant reference in the [Coma-
rofs’] analysis, even though […] he is mentioned more 
often than his work is examined” but, on the other 
hand, “Benjamin […] is the condition of possibility of a cri-
tique of the postcolony in the Comarofs’ work” (Acosta 
López 2019, 18; emphasis added). The interesting point, 
however, is the way in which Acosta —in spite of pur-
suing a diferent analytical path focusing on how the 
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Comarofs lesh out a postcolonial form of critique that 
signals the limits of Foucault’s theory of power— ends 
up ofering the clues to unraveling Benjamin’s inluence 
in Jean and John Comarof’s work.8 Indeed, in locating in 
their critique a shuttling “between the visible theatri-
cality of power and its invisible imperceptible spheres 
of action” (Acosta López 2019, 22) and the interest of 
the state “with making visible its capacity for hiding and 
keeping invisible [the structural violence that supports 
it] and the arbitrariness of their foundation” (Acosta 
López 2019, 22), she directs our attention to what we 
think is the Benjaminian backbone of the Comarofs’ 
theoretical and ethnographic elaborations on the con-
tinuity of law and violence in postcolonial settings. 
Indeed, as we will see, the dialectic of visibility and 
invisibility conjured up by Acosta’s essay puts forward 
one of Benjamin’s central ideas in Critique of Violence. 
In what sense is the dialectic of the visibility and invis-
ibility of power in the postcolony Benjaminian? Why is 
the continuity of law and violence in Benjamin’s Critique 
of Violence foregrounded by this dialectic? In trying to 
answer these questions we take up the challenge posed 
by Acosta of exploring how it is that Benjamin is the 
condition of possibility of Jean and John Comarof’s work 
that, paradoxically, remains unexamined.
Discerning how a given body of theoretical work fol-
lows in Benjamin’s footsteps in Critique of Violence is 
not an easy task.9 To be sure, “this uneasy, enigmatic, 
terribly equivocal text” (Derrida 1990, 973 note 1), an 
essay “remarkable for its lofty and somber tone poised 
on the edge of incantation” (Taussig 2006, 184), which 
could be read in numerous ways for its “structure is 
far more a series of overlapping elements than the 
presence of sustained and deliberate argumentation” 
(Benjamin 2013, 94), ofers several analytical avenues to 
approach the continuity between law and violence. The 
mosaic-like texture of Benjamin’s writing-style (Ferris 
2004, 5-6) therefore allows us to trace which of the “ele-
ments” in Critique of Violence is the explicit or the unstat-
ed premise of a work drawing on Benjamin’s ideas. In this 
vein, we suggest that Jean and John Comarof’s work 
could be productively read in light of the spectrality of 
the continuum between lawmaking and law-preserving 
violence —encapsulated in the idea of the “police”— that 
haunts Benjamin’s text. Let’s see how.
8 Even if Acosta pursues this diferent path, she ends up return-
ing —with her dialectic of the visibility and invisibility of 
power in Jean and John Comarof’s work— to the very central 
meaning of the idea of spectrality at the center of Benjamin’s 
discussion of the continuity between lawmaking and law-pre-
serving violence. This, to some extent, conirms the Derridian 
idea that Critique of Violence is a “haunted” text that contami-
nates —with its ghosts— any text in its vicinity (see below). In 
this sense, Acosta’s essay, even if trying to take a detour from 
Benjamin, ends up being haunted by Benjamin’s specters.
9 The secondary literature on Critique of Violence is vast and 
rich. For a sampler of exemplary readings of Benjamin’s text 
see Benjamin 2013, 137 note 1.
In Critique of Violence, Benjamin provides a number of 
examples of the continuity between lawmaking and 
law-preserving violence. He, however, devotes a great-
er deal of attention to the death penalty and the police. 
These two cases, for Benjamin, seem to put forward, in 
the most striking fashion, “law itself in its origin,” the 
very moment of “violence crowned by fate” where 
“the origins of law jut manifestly and fearsomely into 
existence” and “law reairms itself” revealing “some-
thing rotten” at its heart (Benjamin 1996 [1921], 242). Yet, 
if these “fearsome” origins of the law are brought about 
by the death penalty, they are revealed with even great-
er force by this “institution of the modern state” that is 
“the police,” which “can intervene ‘for security reasons’ 
in countless cases where no clear legal situation exists” 
(242-243). Here, lawmaking and law-preserving vio-
lence appear in a “far more unnatural combination… in 
a kind of spectral mixture”, so that the power of police 
derives from its being “formless, like its nowhere-tangi-
ble, all-pervasive, ghostly presence in the life of civilized 
states” (242-243, emphasis added). Although, of course, 
Benjamin literally refers to the police as a materially 
locatable institution of the state —the one that is gen-
erally the conceptual object of classic constitutional 
and administrative law—, “policing,” as Andrew Benja-
min remarks, “is a process that need not depend on the 
actual presence of the police” (Benjamin 2013, 111).10 In 
our view, the idea of the “police” can be approached 
beyond its usual institutional manifestations precise-
ly because it is “spectral,” “formless,” “intangible” and 
“ghostly.”11 In this sense, it stands as an allegory for 
what the law is—the very continuity (not to say the 
indistinction)12 between lawmaking and law-preserv-
ing violence. In other words, the law is the law precisely 
10 Derrida also highlights the ubiquity of the police, understood 
as the encapsulation of the continuum between lawmaking 
and law-preserving violence. In his view, “[w]here there are 
police, which is to say everywhere and even here, we can no 
longer discern between two types of violence, conserving 
and founding, and that is the ignoble, ignominious, disgust-
ing ambiguity” (Derrida 1990, 1007).
11 Michael Taussig puts forward a similar argument when he 
remarks —drawing on Coetzee and Benjamin— that policing 
is a form of “mythological warfare” because of “their [the 
police] ghostly being, a suspended sort of violent nothing-
ness.” He goes on to explain that the Benjaminian police 
occupy “a sort of no-man’s land indispensable to the main-
tenance of the law” (Taussig 2006, 176). Taussig’s key point, 
in our view, is that police functions as the stand-in for the 
general operation of law because it indicates that law 
in the Benjaminian sense (as the continuity between law-
making and law-preserving violence) is not subjected (and 
cannot be subjected) to law in the liberal sense (law as the 
opposite and antidote to violence); that the means and ends 
of law are indistinguishable because self-preservation is 
the law’s sole purpose; that the reproduction of the violence 
of legal foundation in the implementation of law is endless.
12 Benjamin remarks, “the ignominy of such an authority [the 
police]… lies in the fact that in this authority, the separation 
of lawmaking and law-preserving violence is suspended” 
(Benjamin 1996 [1921], 242-243; emphasis added).
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because it conlates these two forms of violence and 
this conlation ubiquitously reproduces itself whenev-
er the law is invoked and implemented (cf. 112, 117-118).13 
Drawing on Christoph Menke’s reading of Critique of 
Violence, it is possible to suggest that the spectrality 
of the police (as a stand-in for the idea of the law itself) 
reveals the “rotten” nature of law because it shows 
how the violence of its creation is endlessly reinstated 
in each and every act of legal implementation—some-
thing “rotten” dwells at the heart of the law because 
its only purpose is its self-preservation (Menke 2018, 
31-32). The violence of the foundational act of the law is 
thus doubled, once and again, in all of its enforcements, 
like a ghost that obsessively comes to haunt the realm 
of the living.
It is the very idea of spectrality in a Critique of Violence 
that brings the Comarofs to repeatedly resort to the 
continuum of lawmaking and law-preserving violence 
to ground their theoretical and ethnographic observa-
tions on law and disorder in the postcolony. It is as if 
their texts were haunted by similar specters to those 
haunting Benjamin’s text.14 From Benjamin to Derrida 
to the Comarofs, spectrality shrouds all their argu-
ments —the “quasi-logic of the phantom” (Derrida 1990, 
973 note 1) is the decisive force undergirding their most 
important ideas.15 Like a virus, spectrality contaminates 
13 Although allegorical in the indicated sense, spectrality does 
have material efects. In the context of the contemporary 
operations of global capitalism, the continuity of lawmak-
ing and law-preserving violence has distinctive material 
consequences on the distribution of power, wealth, and 
afect. This point is clearly made by Jean and John Comarof 
when they argue, “unlike others who have discussed the 
‘new spectral reality’ of that economy…, we do not talk here 
in metaphorical terms. We seek, instead, to draw attention 
to, to interrogate, the distinctly pragmatic qualities of the 
messianic, millennial capitalism of the moment: a capitalism 
that presents itself as a gospel of salvation; a capitalism that, 
if rightly harnessed, is invested with the capacity wholly to 
transform the universe of the marginalized and disempow-
ered” (Comarof and Comarof 2000, 292).
14 It is no wonder that Jacques Derrida —whose whole thinking 
could be considered a “hauntology” (Derrida 1994, 62-63)— 
organized his reading of Critique of Violence around the 
permanent doubling of the violence of the foundational 
moment of the law in every one of its later instantiations. 
In the second part of “Force of Law”, one of the most inlu-
ential readings of Critique of Violence, he insists on reading 
Benjamin’s essay through the prism of spectrality. In his 
view, this is a text that “is haunted by haunting itself, by a 
quasi-logic of the phantom which, because it is the more 
forceful one, should be substituted for an ontological logic 
of presence, absence or representation” (Derrida 1990, 973 
note 1). Later in his essay, while reading the idea of the 
“police,” Derrida intimates that “this text is a ghost story,” 
which “does not escape the law that it states. It is ruined and 
contaminated, it becomes the specter of itself” (1007, 1009).
15 The Comarofs also make explicit reference to the passage 
of Critique of Violence dealing with the police. At times, their 
analysis refers to the institutional, material dimension 
of the police —the police as armed “cops” in uniform, as it 
were— like, for example, when they argue that “[e]choes of 
any text that pursues Benjamin’s ghosts. Even if direct 
references to Critique of Violence are scant in Jean 
and John Comarof’s work —or, in María del Rosario 
Acosta’s words, Benjamin “is mentioned more often 
than his work is examined”— the fact that spectrality 
is the logic of their most decisive arguments, makes 
Benjamin’s ideas “the condition of possibility of [their] 
critique of the postcolony.” In the classic and inluential 
introduction to Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, they 
read the Benjaminian canon as establishing that law 
and violence —whose “historical ainity seems beyond 
dispute” (Comarof and Comarof 2006, 2)— are not pit-
ted against one another, but are mutually constitutive. 
In their view, “law originates in violence and lives by 
violent means… in other words, the legal and the lethal 
animate and inhabit one another” (31).
These direct references to Benjamin provide literal 
grounding to a spectral logic that is the key analyti-
cal framework to understanding the dynamics of law 
and violence in times of neoliberal governance in the 
postcolony. By this logic, the Comarofs provide an 
explanation of the “metaphysics of disorder” in the 
postcolonial world; of how it is possible that liberal-
ization, democratization and a fetishism of the law 
coincide with “an epidemic of criminal violence in these 
polities” (Comarof and Comarof 2006, 2-4). In their 
view, under the “efects of neoliberal deregulation on 
governance” (16) the state has lost its monopoly over sov-
ereignty as the sole producer of law and order. State 
sovereignty in the postcolony is an item that —like a 
Rolex watch or a Louis Vuitton bag— can be counter-
feited by countless private authorities that enforce 
their particular regimes of law and order in intersect-
ing particular geographical locations. In these settings, 
“the reach of the state is uneven and the landscape is a 
palimpsest of contested sovereignties, codes, and juris-
dictions —a complex choreography of police and para-
militaries, private and community enforcement, gangs 
and vigilantes, highwaymen and outlaw armies” (9). 
The Comarofs’ postcolony is the site of a “counterfeit 
modernity” (13) where the sovereignty of the state is 
permanently haunted by the specters of perfectly coun-
terfeited private sovereignties. The interplay between 
original sovereign powers and their replicas makes it 
impossible to discern a unique center of law and order, 
thus opening up a space of spectrality (“an uncer-
tain space between signiiers” [15; emphasis added]) 
between the legal and the illegal. This space “actively 
[sustains] zones of ambiguity between the presence and 
absence of the law” (5; emphasis added), “[exploits] the 
Walter Benjamin, almost a hundred years on: the cops are 
still making the law as they break it, but even more so, and 
in more militarized manner” (Comarof and Comarof 2016, 
36). On other occasions, they seem to refer more generally 
to the police as the master trope for the continuity of law-
making and law-preserving violence, which “stands as a 
cogent counter to Weberian idealism” (14).
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new aporias of jurisdiction” (5; emphasis added), pro-
duces “murky geographies of crime and violence” (8; 
emphasis added), occurs “in the twilight markets fos-
tered by liberalization” (10; emphasis added), renders 
“even more inchoate the line between the forged and 
the far-fetched, the spirit and the letter of the counter-
feit” (15; emphasis added), allows “people to exploit the 
interstices between oicial and backstage realities” (17; 
emphasis added), and produces “shadowy networks that 
are neither illicit nor licensed” (21; emphasis added). In 
the postcolony, the zone between legality and illegality, 
order and disorder, the legitimate and the counterfeit-
ed, is therefore more a twilight zone than a bright line; 
a shadowy, aporetical and interstitial region of uncer-
tainty, ambiguity, and murkiness that creates “a contem-
porary sense of inscrutability” (16; emphasis in original).
Jean and John Comarof further pursue the trope 
of spectrality in The Truth about Crime. Here, they 
argue that the twilight zone of legality and illegal-
ity —this time called the “specter of crime” (Coma-
rof and Comarof 2016, 27-36)— has the conceptual 
power to reveal the truth of state-making (or what 
they call the “morphing of the state”) not only in the 
postcolonial world, but in the world at large. Following 
Durkheim’s observation that “without law-breaking… 
societies would resolve into chaos” (xiv), they intimate 
that “law-making, law-breaking and law-enforcement 
are especially critical registers in which societies con-
struct, contest, and confront truths about themselves” 
(xii).16 Crime has thus become a “vernacular” that will 
produce “truths” of a world that is “growing increas-
ingly inscrutable” (xiv), for it is undergoing “a tectonic 
shift in the relationship between capital, governance, 
and the state” (8). Here, the expansion of neoliberalism 
has produced a paradoxical situation where the state 
is, at the same time, “hyperpresent” (through strong 
law-enforcement practices aimed at the criminaliza-
tion “protest, poverty, diference, and dissent” [26]) and 
“palpably absent” (because of the devolution of basic 
policing and welfare state duties into private hands [27]). 
Again, sovereignty becomes an equivocal item appear-
ing in the spectral space of presence/absence. Against 
the backdrop of growing planetary inequality and the 
16 In the context of his relections on the spectrality of the 
police in Benjamin’s Critique of Violence, Michael Tauss-
ig makes a similar point. In his view, what the law and 
its attendant order are (meaning the liberal view of law 
as the antipode of violence) can only be discerned in the 
moment of their transgression. In this sense, there is no 
clear boundary between legality and illegality, order and 
disorder, but a spectral zone of indetermination. The police 
(being the suspension of the distinction between law mak-
ing and law-preserving violence) as boundary-keeper and 
the boundary to be policed (between legality and illegality) 
are both spectral: law thus seems to operate in an eerie zone 
where spectrality polices spectrality. For Taussig, “the spec-
tral nature of the police is due not to unclear boundaries but to 
the incessant demand for transgression by the boundary itself” 
(Taussig 2006, 185; emphasis in original).
lack of any serious talk (let alone any implementation) 
on structural solutions to the extensive precarization of 
populations, the “criminal specter” —a combination of 
the blurring of the line between the legal and the illegal 
and the “pervasive sense that crime lurks everywhere” 
(31)— appears as a rhetorical device for discussing major 
anxieties of our time. Crime has therefore become the 
“lingua franca” (37) to talk about the “inscrutability” of 
our times. The truth that will be revealed through the 
“metaphysical optic” (8) of that language will not, how-
ever, appear in terms of transparent representation. 
Rather, it will be as spectral as the spectral and fractured 
sovereignties whose manifestations it seeks to explain.
In sum, through a set of notions that constantly con-
jure up the idea of spectrality, Jean and John Comarof 
engage Walter Benjamin’s continuity between law-
making and law-preserving violence and develop a 
“postcolonial form of critique” —to borrow María del 
Rosario Acosta’s argument— that helps to unravel the 
complexities of the mutually constitutive nature of 
law and violence in the postcolony. Their work is thus 
the sort of theoretical and ethnographic query capable 
of interrupting the Colombian foundational narrative of 
civilization and barbarism that, as we argued above, has 
obscured the possibility to understand in what sense 
legal reform may reproduce the very violence that 
it intends to end. The essays in the dossier —drawing 
on many of the Comarofs’ insights— examine several 
aspects of the continuum between law and violence after 
the signature of the Peace Accord between the Colombi-
an Government and the FARC. In the next section, we 
explain how these essays it within a “postcolonial 
form of critique” that —based on the logic of spectral-
ity— shows how, in Colombia, law and violence —or 
civilization and barbarism— are mutually constitutive.
The foundational narrative and the 
continuity of law and violence in Colombia’s 
post-conflict scenario
Will the promises of peace brought by the Peace Accord 
deliver? Current trends seem to forecast a failure of the 
state-expanding dimensions of the Accords, brought 
about by government’s inability to deliver the robust 
state-presence promised. The spiral of violence persists 
in some regions, notably the southern Paciic coast 
border with Ecuador and the Catatumbo border with 
Venezuela, associated with the growing strength of 
drug traicking cartels. Some regions of the western 
plains also bear the threat of dissident guerrillas that 
failed to disarm. In this context, the threat of violence 
posed by state-expansion itself is missed, as violence is 
consistently portrayed as the result of state absence, 
and the role of prohibition and austerity programs 
downplayed in the descending spiral. The articles in 
this dossier however point to the dangers of ignoring the 
continuities of law and violence.
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In “Security and Development? A Story about Petty 
Crime, the Petty State and its Petty Law,” Luis Eslava and 
Lina Buchely tell a story about how the “tectonic shift” 
in the articulation of capital, governance, and the State 
—the condition that, according to the Comarofs, char-
acterizes our times— has taken place in Cali through the 
implementation of “security and development” policies. 
For Eslava and Buchely, these policies are exemplary of 
the dynamics of state-making in post-conlict Colombia 
where public authorities are forced to respond to citi-
zenship perceptions that criminality is out of hand, but 
are unable to respond to human vulnerabilities at the 
root of criminal phenomena through the implementa-
tion of truly structural solutions. Caught in this paradox, 
local authorities can only take action through “margin-
al,” “small,” “trivial,” and “limsy” solutions representing 
“second-class ixes which produce second-class subjects 
and second-class visions of State and law” (Eslava and 
Buchely 2019, 41). Under the security and development 
aegis, the State and its law thus become “petty.”
Eslava and Buchely rehearse these arguments in the 
context of the analysis of Jóvenes sin fronteras, a pro-
gram implemented by Cali’s local administration aimed 
at including young people at risk of entering criminal 
networks into city life through “systematic afective 
interventions.” Instead of focusing on “collective or 
structural causal factors,” Cali’s authorities intervene 
in the lives of the youngsters in the program through 
seeking their “individual ‘healing’” (Eslava and Buchely 
2019, 42) and their assimilation to “the community val-
ues required by (formal and legal) city life” (Eslava and 
Buchely 2019, 44). These “neo-developmental punitive 
technologies” —as Eslava and Buchely dub them— exem-
plify the simultaneous “hyperpresence” and “palpable 
absence” of the state of our times that the Comarofs 
so strikingly describe in their work. Indeed, Jóvenes sin 
fronteras saturates the lives of its beneiciaries with 
the state and its law, but this saturation creates a “petty 
state” and a “petty law” for it never has the potential 
to intervene in the root causes of their vulnerability. 
The “petty state” produces second-class subjects whose 
precarity is reproduced by the very state action that 
was supposedly aimed at eradicating it. For Eslava and 
Buchely, “[p]etty criminals and the (petty) state and its 
(petty) law mutually create and recreate themselves 
without ever deinitively eradicating their liminality or 
the insecurities that unite them” (Eslava and Buchely 
2019, 42). This idea clearly recreates the notion that 
civilization and barbarism (or law and violence) are not 
dichotomous, but rather that they stand in a continuum. 
At the heart of “petty” local public policies lies the ideal of 
including unruly young people into “civilized” city life. In 
their “petty” operation, however, these policies reinstate 
the very violence of precarity they seek to overcome.
Another variation of the “criminal specter” and the 
spectral dialectic of presence/absence of the state is 
pursued by Carolina Olarte in “From Territorial Peace 
to Territorial Paciication: Anti-Riot Police Powers and 
Socio-Environmental Dissent in the Implementation 
of Colombia’s Peace Agreement.” In her essay, Olarte 
explores how difering notions of “territorial peace” have 
played out in the Colombian post-conlict. While the 
Government has sought to address inequality and pover-
ty and respond to local needs in terms of purely devel-
opmental policies, many local communities have opposed 
this vision with competing notions of what the territory 
means. This debate —which, for Olarte (2019, 27), is about 
“the meanings, representations, and interventions of 
the territory as a lived experience (el territorio vivido), its 
scope, and relational dimensions”— has been at the cen-
ter of the many socio-environmental conlicts that trans-
pired during the negotiation of the Peace Agreement and, 
later, in the context of its implementation. Here, Olarte 
detects a contradiction between the governmental prom-
ise of demilitarization and the rising presence of anti-riot 
police in those territories where socio-environmental 
conlicts have been on the rise.
Policing of land use and access to natural resources 
reveals, on the one hand, how space is being produced 
in the Colombian transitional scenario and, on the other 
hand, how the historical continuity of socio-economic 
injustices is being rendered invisible and depoliticized 
by this practice. Indeed, as Olarte intimates, rearranging 
“postconlict rurality” according to a (policed) notion 
of development “the natural bridge that will connect 
conlict societies with past and present socio-economic 
issues and injustices” is a form of “geographical taming” 
(Olarte-Olarte 2019, 30) that immunizes and legitimates 
historical forms of dispossession; a mode of “sanitizing a 
political economy of inequality” (Olarte-Olarte 2019, 31). 
The Benjaminian specter of the police —the very con-
tinuity between lawmaking and law-preserving vio-
lence— appears in post-conlict government initiatives 
seeking to civilize violent, underdeveloped and bar-
baric territories through development public policies. 
By turning socio-environmental dissent into a public 
order issue, Colombian post-conlict law —encapsulated 
in a set of police manuals and protocols that stigmatize 
social protest— violently preserves itself by hiding the 
historical continuity of dispossession of land and natural 
resources in Colombia. Olarte illustrates her argument 
by showing how the policing by the ESMAD of local 
protests against the Ituango dam and the “liberation 
of Mother Earth” in Northern Cauca turned peaceful 
protesters into a threat against public order and right-
ful land-claimants into trespassers. In both cases, the 
presence of anti-riot police is a clear manifestation of 
the “criminal specter” that operates in neoliberal times, 
for it presents social mobilization against inequality and 
precarization as a form of rampant criminality. Here, 
the state is simultaneously “hyperpresent” through its 
anti-riot police and “palpably absent” in the correction of 
those structural inequalities undergirding social protest.
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In “Religious Practices, State Techniques and Conlicted 
Forms of Violence in Colombia’s Peace-Building 
Scenarios,” Carlos Manrique recreates the continuity of 
lawmaking and law-preserving violence in the context 
of some conlicts over the secular nature of the state 
in post-conlict Colombia. In his piece, he sets out to 
“critically interrogate this dominant framework [lib-
eral secularism] of interpretation and political evalua-
tion” by trying to “re-conceptualize what does it take 
for a religious discourse or practice to inscribe itself 
in the law” (Manrique 2019, 57). Manrique’s reframing of 
the “theoretical-philosophical tools” needed to critically 
gauge liberal secularism in our times, irst appears in 
his discussion of the oicial consecration in 2017 of two 
Colombian towns to Jesus Christ and, then, in his analy-
sis of the deep involvement of Buenaventura’s Catholic 
authorities in the 2017 civic strike in that same town. 
In the first case, he shows how the liberal secular-
ist condemnation of the legal consecration of towns 
to Jesus Christ hides the way in which the nature 
of the law as law is to silence “certain forms of life, of 
conduct and of sensibility” (Manrique 2019, 62). This 
silence —akin to Benjamin’s spectral police power— is 
“an irreducible silence that haunts the law’s language” 
(Manrique 2019, 62). For Manrique, by presenting these 
decrees —whose material efects on the lives of peo-
ple are “almost null”— as scandalous, barbaric and 
highly exceptional, the civilizing liberal secularist argu-
ment obscures the ways in which everyday legislation 
has true materially depriving efects on people’s and 
communities daily lives.
This theme is further developed in Manrique’s analysis 
of the defense by local Catholic authorities of the legit-
imacy of Buenaventura’s 2017 civic strike. In his view, 
this religious involvement in social protest challenges 
the liberal secularist argument that only focuses on the 
“explicit appearance of religious language in the text 
of the law” (represented, for example, by the legal con-
secration of towns to Jesus Christ) and simultaneously 
ignores other ways in which religion may transform 
state practices (such as the agreement that put an end to 
the Buenaventura strike where the Colombian govern-
ment committed to invest more resources to improve the 
material welfare of the town). In this sense, Manrique’s 
theoretical venture recreates the spectral dialectic of 
visibility and invisibility. He tries to explain why liber-
al secularist arguments are exceedingly intense when 
the State is “hyperpresent” (the decrees case) and have 
almost nothing to say when what is at stake is the state’s 
“palpable absence” (the strike case). On the one hand, for 
Manrique, secularism ignores the continuity between 
pastoral practices and State governance that tends to 
appear in less spectacular forms of religious political 
participation such as the Catholic Church’s participation 
in the Buenaventura strike. On the other, when liberal 
secularists do react in these cases, their arguments end 
up silencing the “transformative and emancipatory forc-
es and political processes that vindicate the experiences 
and demands of the most disadvantaged of our social 
order” (70). Here, civilizing liberal secularist discourse 
sought to domesticate unruly local priests in a move that 
reproduced a history of oicial violence against social 
protest in Colombia.
Conclusion
The articles in this dossier follow John and Jean 
Comarof’s lead in resisting the opposition of law and 
violence. Instead they explore the ways in which they 
are mutually constitutive, in the Benjaminian tradition 
explained by Acosta. The normalization of poverty 
through state programs that refuse to engage with 
structural causes of exclusion and the criminalization 
of poverty (Eslava and Buchely). Laws are also complicit 
in the criminalization of resistance of the concentration 
of land property for example, and fail to limit its efects 
on peasant communities, including violence (Olarte). The 
State’s all-encompassing ambition to rule through law 
can also silence alternative forms of legitimate gover-
nance such as pastoral care (Manrique). A closer reading 
of the peace agreement through this lens might reveal 
the costs of even a successful implementation of the 
Peace Accord.
A conceptual lens that sees the continuities between 
law and violence might reveal the violence woven into 
an accord that, in many ways, builds on the lessons of 
counter-insurgency programs by expanding State pres-
ence with little consideration of its costs. Some of these 
costs are already emerging in ways that can only be 
thought about through this conceptual lens: for exam-
ple, the commodiication of rapidly disappearing for-
ests, the tensions between peasant communities and 
transnational extractive companies, the lack of legiti-
macy of state institutions and the erosion of traditional 
forms of leadership and problem solving. Only if law 
and society studies resist the idea that State presence 
and the rule of law are at the core of civilization and 
peace, can they recognize the struggle between forms of 
civilization and coexistence and the expansion of State 
rule. And this requires us to inally abandon the founda-
tional narrative of civilization and barbarism, in its con-
servative, liberal and leftist forms, to instead study the 
complexity of transactions, the exact transformations 
and the baring of costs and enjoyment of the beneits 
brought about by peace.
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